I have looked through the latest logic textbooks (Copi-Cohen, Hausman-Kahane-Tidman, Hurley, Salmon, Gensler, Walton, etc.), and they steadfastly contain the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. A spot reading of these popular textbooks in the collegiate market shows the dichotomy to exist in the following variations: They all deprecate any standard of goodness in logical arguments. They all claim that anyone can call himself logical without having the facts, or factual without being logical. And they maintain the so-called distinction between a sound argument and a cogent argument.
For the modern logicians, it is problematic to call an argument good or bad. They dare not say they have a normative standard for judging arguments in this manner. Accordingly, they can only say an argument is logical, based strictly on its form. For deduction, they sneak in something called “soundness.” Allegedly, a sound argument is a valid argument which just happens to have true premises. (An unsound argument is a valid argument whose premises are false.) They sneak in similarly for induction something called “cogency.” On their view, the basic division is not between good and bad reasoning but between the form and the content of reasoning, on the basis of ontology. And logical forms, for them, are devoid of ontology, which is why the mere mention of “goodness” is inappropriate.
By contrast, from our perspective, the classification is false. Logical forms do indeed have an ontological basis. Their protestations to the contrary, how logicians analyze propositions into subjects and predicates is determined by how they view the basic structure of the world. (See Bertrand Russell’s revealing analysis about “the ultimate furniture of the world.” [Cf. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy]) Observe the mess that is called predicate logic; without realizing it, these logicians have assumed that universal functions (classes, operators, and quantifiers) and subject particulars are in the world. Is this not an ontology? (See Henry Veatch’s Realism and Nominalism Revisited.) What is the better classification? How about arguments being divided into logical ones and illogical ones, on the basis of truth? Under illogical arguments are those with false premises (zero factual strength), invalid structure (zero logical strength), or both. And if we combine the fallacies of relevance (psycho-epistemological, rhetorical, contextual, grammatical), the classification is a tripartite: good argument, zero-strength argument, and irrelevant “argument.” The logical is the good.
Soundness and cogency have dichotomous qualities for modern logicians. Because soundness is an attribution of deductive arguments with true premises, these modern logicians claim that a sound argument is not reflective of the real world. They have two reasons for this: First, soundness depends on the notion of validity for assessing logical strength. But this is an either-or attribute, yet it seems the world admits gradations. Second, they claim sound arguments reach their end in axioms—that is, all series of asking the whys of the premises of the premises of the premises of arguments end with some finite set of axioms—and axioms for the moderns are conventional, arbitrary starting principles that have no contact with reality. So a sound argument may be logical but may not be factual.
Only a cogent argument, they claim, can make that factual claim, but at a great cost: it can have no certainty. Because cogency is an attribution of inductive arguments with concrete facts for premises, it cannot claim to establish anything universally true; for how can a being of limited capacity, such as human beings, be able to examine all the facts in order to be assured the generalization holds for all instances. Omniciently, how can a sampling of concretes reaches a conclusion covering a population of them? So, because cogency depends on facts from experience, cogent arguments can never have the status of logical certainty, the logical certainty that sound arguments have.
From the Objectivist perspective, by contrast, this is a division by nonessential. There is no false alternative. The means to ascertain knowledge of the world cannot be the factor said to inhibit ascertaining knowledge! And it is human knowledge, not godly knowledge, that we care to seek. Knowledge can only be gained through perceptual experience and through reflective reasoning. Perception without reflection yields an animal-level of awareness. And reasoning without experience yields groundless abstractions. As for the series of whys of the premises, the endpoint is actual perception, not axioms. [TAOR 454d] The false alternative rests on the Kantian premise, according to Rand: “Man is limited to a consciousness of a specific nature, which perceives by specific means and not others, therefore, his consciousness is not valid; man is blind, because he has eyes—deaf, because he has ears—deluded, because he has a mind—and the things he perceives do not exist, because he perceives them.” [FTNI, 32a] For the modern logicians, because a person studies logic, his logical thinking does not help him to live on earth.
Now, aren’t you glad that logic can be studied under Objectivist tutelage?