Ayn Rand’s writings on psychology are highly condensed and elliptical. A proper understanding of her treatment of the subject may require expanding her use of psychological terms. Take, for example, a passage in TVOS “The ‘Conflicts’ of Men’s Interests,” pp. 50-51:
In choosing his goals (the specific values he seeks to gain and/or keep), a rational man is guided by his thinking (by a process of reason)–not by his feelings or desires. He does not regard desires as irreducible primaries, as the given, which he is destined irresistibly to pursue. He does not regard “because I want it” or “because I feel like it” as a sufficient cause and validation of his actions. He chooses and/or identifies his desires by a process of reason, and he does not act to achieve a desire until and unless he is able rationally to validate it in the full context of his knowledge and of his other values and goals. He does not act until he is able to say: “I want it because it is right.”
As with anything reducible to the axiomatic concept of “consciousness,” which refers both to a state of awareness of existence and to the faculty that originates it, so the concept of “desire” also has these dual aspects and refers not only to an emotional state with reactionary impulse but also to the concrete object that originates it. In order then to interpret properly Ayn Rand’s writings on psychological subjects, we need to pay attention to her usage of psychological terms. We need to be mindful, when we encounter one, of whether she uses it either in the primary sense as an experiential state, or in the secondary sense as an originating object.
A proper interpretation of the above excerpt becomes easier with some re-editing:
In choosing his goals (the specific values he seeks to gain and/or keep), a rational man is guided by his thinking (by a process of [reason the reasoning faculty])–not by his feelings or desires. He does not regard desires as irreducible primaries, as the given, [the objects of] which he is destined irresistibly to pursue. He does not regard “because I want it” or “because I feel like it” as a sufficient cause and validation of his actions. He chooses and/or identifies his [objects of] desires by [a process of reason thinking], and he does not act to achieve [an object of] desire until and unless he is able rationally to validate it in the full context of his knowledge and of his other values and goals. He does not act until he is able to say: “I want it because [the thinking process in validating] it is right.”
Note also that “right” and “wrong” are attributions applicable only to actions in time and actors in place (while “good” and “bad” are ascribed to things in relation to a valuer). A desire as such is thus neither right nor wrong since it is an automatic reaction-an emotion. What we can say is that the process for codifying a system of values, which underlies desires, is right or wrong; or that the process for validating a specific object of desire is right or wrong. An object in relation to a valuer is simply either good or bad, on some standard of values.
All of this may not be new to some long-time Objectivists, but it is new to me. Rand’s writings are amazingly rich in contents, only if we can extract them. In fact, and as an aside, it was only very recently that I discovered the significance of the word “specific” in the above excerpt. What is the significance? Values, as defined by Rand, are concrete particulars. What the excerpt tells us is that goals are concrete singulars. It finally dawned on me that values aren’t abstract!